

European seminar: « The Common Security and Defense Policy »

Friday 15 May 2020

With support of [to be confirmed]:

- Parliament of Lithuania



- Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis



Animation of the seminar:

Animation of the round-tables :

Venue: Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis, Didžioji Str. 5 LT-01128
Vilnius, Lithuania

9:00 - Welcome of the participants

9:15 Opening of the conference

Welcome words: Michel SENIMON, General Delegate of EUROPA - DGSA-DRH of the University of Limoges

Speeches from:

- ▶ ...
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*CSDP is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of which it forms the **operational part**. The CFSP of the European Union was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. It has gradually been strengthened, in particular by the **Treaty of Lisbon**.*

*The CSDP includes the progressive definition of a common European defense policy with the objective of enabling the EU to develop its **military capabilities** and deploy **missions outside its borders** for peacekeeping purposes, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The CSDP must respect the obligations of certain Member States which consider that their common defense is achieved within the framework of **NATO**.*

*CSDP gives the European Union the opportunity to use **military or civilian means** for conflict prevention and international crisis management. We are talking about "military operations" and "civilian missions".*

*The various EU **institutions** play a role in the framework of the CSDP : the European Council and the Council of the European Union, alongside the High Representative, play a major role in CFSP and CSDP, leaving aside the Commission and the Parliament, which in this field are given a minimal role, in particular because of the intergovernmental and highly sovereign nature of these policies. In addition to these institutions, other actors at the European level exist, such as the **support bodies** (the different Committees, the different groups, and the EEAS) or such as **the Union Agencies** (European Defense Agency, Satellite Center EU, EU Security Studies Institution and European Security and Defense College).*

10:15 Introductory report - What is the CSDP the name?

*The **role and place of States** in CFSP and CSDP are paramount. In fact, these policies are, by their very nature, **sovereign powers** of the State. Thus, states are free to pursue their own security and defense policy, insofar as these remain consistent with the position of the European Union.*

So, how is state and European position taking shape? To what extent should the requirement of coherence be observed?

*This questioning also makes sense in relation to **the articulation between the EU and NATO**. Indeed, of the EU Member States, 22 are also members of NATO. How far do they manage to meet their European obligations, while observing those stemming from NATO? More broadly, how can the EU develop a security and defense policy alongside NATO?*

*At the European level, instruments currently exist, such as **permanent structured cooperation** (differentiation modality allowing States wishing to go further), **the European Intervention Initiative** (aimed at bringing out a common European strategic culture), etc.*

*These various tools, certainly existing, remain nevertheless weak. Therefore, it is possible to ask what is the Union's **ambition** with regard to the CSDP, and to what extent is it **achievable**?*

➤ **Rapporteur** : XXXXXXXX

➤ **Co-rapporteurs** : XXXXXXXX

11:00 Roundtable 1: The CSDP, which answers to what threats?

*There is **no consensus or even common perception** about the threats, the nature of the responses, and the institutional channels to take. Terrorist, migratory, climatic, demographic, migratory threats, cyber-attacks, hybrid threats, stability of the African continent, Russian threat?*

*To what extent is it possible to **respond** to these different threats? Above all, how to **identify them** and how to **anticipate them**?*

The answer to these questions requires a coherence and a common strategy between the different States of the Union, major actors in the field of CSDP. Is such synergy possible to identify, anticipate and deal with these different threats?

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➤ **Speakers** : XXXXXXXX

- Debate with the room -

13:00 Buffet offered by Europa and its partners

14:30 Round table 2: The CSDP facing which obstacles?

Once the threats have been identified, we still need to be able to answer them and provide an answer. However, it is undeniable that the implementation of the CSDP faces the full brunt of various obstacles, jeopardizing its development.

*In addition to the **EU / NATO** duality, blocking many European states preferring to act in the Atlantic framework, other obstacles arise: **the Russian influence** of Eastern European states, the **economic crisis**, the tendency to **withdraw into oneself**, the difference in **strategic culture** (armed intervention abroad, sale of weapons, etc.) and perception of threats... At the level of the European Union, the question of the **budget** is also problematic: to what extent is it possible? to set up a common defense, a European army, a European headquarters, and others without a substantial budget?*

Faced with these different obstacles, is it possible to conceive and set up a real common European strategy bringing together all the European States?

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➤ **Speakers** : XXXXXXXX

- Debate with the room -

16:00 Round table 3: The CSDP, power factor for the EU?

The EU is unquestionably a **normative "great power"** with considerable soft power. Yet this is not the case at the military level. Indeed, although the Union's military action already exists, its international activity is not likely to qualify the Union as a "great military power".

The current global context seems, however, to reverse trends. Indeed, the **logics of power relations would no longer be fundamental determinants for qualifying an entity as "power"**. Thus, in this logic, the Union would not need to be strong militarily to be a "great power". However, to what extent can an entity be described as "powerful", if the security of the entity depends mainly on actors outside it?

In addition, it is possible to ask whether the emergence of a strong CSDP could not increase and provide a new tool and a **new means of expressing the** already existing **power** of the Union, without however qualifying it. last of "great military power".

In addition, it is questionable whether the emergence of a stable and stable CSDP would not increase the strength and power of the Union, since the CSDP would provide the Union with a framework members would find **solidarity** and a **strong meeting point**? To do this, it is still necessary that these states have the will and can surpass their own financial, ideological and social difficulties to embark on such a project.

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- Debate with the room -

17:45 Conclusion: Brexit, an obstacle or an opportunity for the CSDP?

The impact of the withdrawal may be nuanced or even favorable to the construction of the CSDP. Indeed, even if, at first glance, the withdrawal of the UK will be a major loss for the EU (the latter being without context a great military power), the practical effects of this withdrawal will be lessened. Indeed, the UK has always been little involved in the implementation of the CSDP, preferring the Atlantist framework, more respectful of its sovereignty.

The main uncertainty is actually in the positioning of the UK will adopt the development of the defense of the EU. On the one hand, it is possible to estimate that, since the interests of European states, including the UK, are converging, its positions will remain consistent with those of the EU, and could even associate as a third State to European operations. The involvement of the UK would then be greater.

Yet, on the other hand, it is possible to imagine that the UK is using its position of strength within the OTNA to weaken the construction of the CSDP.

In any case, the withdrawal of the UK will revitalize some actions currently blocked by the English opposition. This is for example the case of the creation of a headquarters for the EU, the increase of the mandate of the European Defense Agency.

The Brexit could therefore bring a new dynamism, desired and desirable, to the implementation and development of the CSDP.

➤ **Rapporteur** : XXXXXXXX